neric medications were encouraged over brand name medications, but medications representing all therapeutic classes for hypertension treatment were available. Clinicians were encouraged to follow evidence-based practice; however, there was no mandate to use a specific agent in the initial treatment of hypertension.
ALLHAT Officers and Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaborative Research
Group: the Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial. Major outcomes in high-risk hypertensive patients randomized to angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor or calcium channel blocker vs diuretic: the Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT quelae, after hospitalization for isolation. Immediate contact tracing of all passengers was conducted according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendations. 2 These define "close contacts" as passengers in the same row or in the 2 rows in front of and behind infected travelers. Twenty-three passengers in Singapore received oseltamivir phosphate (Tamiflu; Roche Laboratories Inc, Nutley, New Jersey) chemoprophylaxis and a strict 7-day quarantine. The WHO and the destination countries of the other passengers were notified. No additional cases of influenza A(H1N1/2009) were identified through active surveillance. We attempted to contact all passengers and crew to determine risk factors for infection in flight using a standardized questionnaire, but only 19 passengers and 7 crew members responded, since many were traveling and not contactable. We also performed molecular typing on the virus from nasopharyngeal specimens of infected patients.
Clinical and Molecular Evidence for Transmission of Novel Influenza
A total of 596 passengers and crew members were on both legs of the flight. The infected crew member and 4 of 5 affected passengers were in the economy class from row 50 onwards, yielding an overall attack rate of 4.7% for that section compared with 0.2% for the rest of the plane (relative risk, 22.9; 95% confidence interval, 2.7-193.6 [P Ͻ .001]). Infected passengers and crew were younger than those not infected (mean age, 27.5 years vs 37.1 years; P =.02) (Table) . This was consistent with the observation that a higher proportion of infection occurred in younger individuals. 3 Viral genome sequencing 4 using 1949 bases from segments 4 (HA) and 5 (NP) for 4 of the Flight A cases (A/ SG/case 1-4) revealed that all the sequences closely matched sequences from New York. These were distinct from other viruses identified from Singapore and countries outside Flight A's route at that time (as demonstrated by the 98 bootstrap value in the Figure) . The phylogenetic tree built from these sequences shows that the crew member was infected by a virus strain virtually identical to other New York strains circulating at the time, while passengers (including the business class passenger [case 2]) were infected by viruses that could be derivatives of this strain. Overall, the molecular and epidemiological data support the evidence of in-flight transmission of influenza A(H1N1/2009), although the precise mode of transmission is difficult to ascertain with certainty.
Comment. Modern commercial aircraft with highefficiency particulate filters and frequent recirculation of cabin air have reduced the risk of transmission of airborne respiratory infections. Spread of respiratory viral infections, however, is thought to be related to infectivity of the source patient(s), proximity, and duration of contacts.
Only 2 of the infected passengers on Flight A would have been detected using the WHO criteria for contact tracing. This was also the case with severe acute respiratory syndrome, 5 another emerging viral infection, transmitted predominantly by large particle droplets and direct contact with respiratory secretions or fomites. Perhaps contact tracing all passengers and crew in the same cabin or served by the same crew might be more appropriate in future airline outbreak investigations.
Human activities including onboard interactions may be important in in-flight influenza transmission. Our study showed that the infected passengers slept less on the plane (P=.06; Table) . This was also reported in an outbreak of influenza on a delayed Alaskan Airlines flight in 1977. 6 Unfortunately, too few of the passengers we studied used hand sanitizers or masks to assess their impact in reducing transmission of respiratory infections in air travel.
The most important limitation of our study is that we were unable to interview the majority of passengers and crew on Flight A or to do airflow, environmental, or seroepidemiological studies. We also depended on reporting from other international agencies to ascertain all infections. We could thus have underestimated the attack rates.
Our clinical, epidemiological, and molecular evidence are, however, highly suggestive that influenza A(H1N1/2009) transmission occurred on board Flight A, possibly through human interaction in a crowded cabin. Efforts to contain future emerging respiratory viral in- 
COMMENTS AND OPINIONS One Can't Judge a Stent by Its Cover
T he "law of unintended consequences" states that any purposeful action will produce some unintended consequences. 1 The recent acquisition of the Guidant Corporation by Boston Scientific (BS) Corporation, Natick, Massachusetts, has led to policies that (1) promote wasteful spending and delay acquisition of necessary clinical information and (2) expose the interventional cardiology community to a potential appearance of conflict of interest at a time when physicianindustry relationships are being carefully scrutinized. [2] [3] [4] In 2006, BS Corporation purchased Guidant Corporation for $27 billion. In an attempt to avoid competitive market imbalance, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also approved the acquisition of Guidant's vascular business by Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Park, Illinois. The 3-way deal was quite complex, and as a result of this deal, BS Corporation was given the right to comarket the Xience V (Abbott Laboratories) drugeluting stent system under a different name (PROMUS; BS Corporation). Marketing approval was then granted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) allowing 2 new (yet identical) options to enter the US market. 5 Clearly, the profits, sales revenue, and market share are dependent on which company supplies the device, but in reality, this should have no impact for the end user.
The FDA has mandated that new drug-eluting stents to the market undergo postmarketing surveillance registries to follow the long-term safety and efficacy of new devices. While we applaud this requirement, there are unintended consequences because these 2 stents are the same. By allowing the identical device to be marketed under 2 different names (Xience V and PROMUS), the FTC and the FDA have created the perception that these 2 stents are actually different devices. Each company is running their own postmarketing registry, which makes no sense for identical devices. Instead of combining resources for 1 large registry of Xience V and PROMUS implantations that could rapidly enroll, separate studies delay enrollment, waste money, and most importantly divert attention and resources away from optimal patient care.
It would appear that excess profit concerns have led to a situation that has shifted the focus away from the patient. Companies bring products to market that are similar if not identical (in this case) to other products. Physicians choose between these products based on factors beyond what is best for the patient.
Dealing with these "2" stents in the marketplace varies across the country. Hospitals and buying groups have the choice of purchasing identical products in different colored boxes, with different names, from 2 different vendors. Some hospitals have chosen one over the other, while others have honored historic relationships and have products from both companies. With the assumption of price neutrality, which is often difficult for physicians to ascertain (owing to lack of awareness, lack of knowledge,
